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Introduction 
 
In recent decades many countries have experienced banking crisis, for example 
Mexico (1994-1995), East Asian countries (after 1997) and transition economies (in 
1990´s). The Czech Republic can not be omitted. 
 
The aim of this article is to characterise the role of early warning signals in 
measuring the vulnerability of countries to systemic banking crisis and to analyse 
how successfully these indicators could have been able to predict the banking crisis 
in case of Czech Republic.  
 
The first part of this paper defines the term banking crisis and describes indicators of 
banking crisis. The content of the second part of the paper are the individual early 
warning signals. The next part contains the characteristics of banking crisis in the 
Czech Republic. The last chapter tries to analyse the level of success of early 
warning signals in predicting the banking crisis in the Czech Republic. 
 
Theoretical aspects of banking crisis 
 
A systemic banking crisis is a situation in which most of the banking sector is 
affected by financial distress. As an indicator of such situation can act:  
 
• the level of nonperforming (in other words classified) loans higher than given 
threshold: Caprio and Klingebiel (1997) exercise 5 – 10 % of total loans; 
Goldstein and Turner (1996) determine the threshold as 15 – 20 % of total 
loans;  
 
• costs of the crisis paid from the government budget higher than given 
threshold: Caprio and Klingebiel (1997) apply as the threshold 2 % of GDP; 
Goldstein and Turner (1996) exercise 5 % of GDP1;  
 
• intervention acts of government, for example deposit guarantees, bank 
recapitalization plans, deposit freezes, nationalizations etc.;  
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 It involves costs of lender of last resort function, costs connected with cleaning of banks´ 
balance sheets by transfer of nonperforming loans, capital injections to insolvent or illiquid 
banks etc.  
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• number of bank failures;  
 
• significant depositor runs. 
 
Systemic banking crisis can have very painful effects and is connected with 
relatively high costs2. It concerns not only fiscal costs directly paid from state 
budget but economic costs (that means the slowdown of GDP growth) as well. 
Resolving such crisis is not easy3. However, the knowledge and taking advantage of 
early warning signals can help to predict the forthcoming crisis. Consequently, early 
warning indicators not only create the conditions for well-timed and adequate 
reactions of economic policy (it is an essential step in improving the ability of the 
official sector to manage and resolve banking crisis) and so mitigate the 
consequences of the crisis. They can act as a prevention of banking crisis as well. 
 
Early warning indicators 
 
An early warning system contents such variables whose behaviour prior to the 
episode of banking crisis is systematically different from that during normal period. 
By monitoring these signals it is possible to detect the forthcoming crisis. As such 
variable can be taken a large number of indicators which are derived from the 
possible causes and determinants of the crisis. Following the classification of factors 
standing behind banking crisis, indicators of forthcoming banking crisis can be 
divided on macroeconomic and microeconomic as well. 
 
The group of macroeconomic early warning signals concerns generally widespread 
and regularly watched indicators, such as: 
• real GDP growth; 
• investments; 
• consumption; 
• rate of inflation; 
• exchange rate and its changes; 
• domestic credit provided to private sector. 
 
Before the banking crisis hit the current position of the economy is very often in the 
status of rapid end of a previous boom: credits to the private sectors have been built 
up rapidly (in many countries accompanied by the liberalization of the financial 
sector), after the provided credits have reached their peak the contraction follows. 
Such development involves the development of real GDP, consumption and 
investments as well: after previous rapid increase these variables suddenly start to 
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 According to Honohan and Klingebiel, most costly crises were those in Indonesia (50 % of 
GDP), Chile (41 % of GDP), Thailand (33 % of GDP) and Uruguay (31 % of GDP) 
3
 Possible reactions of official sector: bank recapitalization plans, capital injections, deposit 
guarantees, liquidity support, regulatory forbearance, debtor bailout schemes etc. 
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decline. The inflation rate start to growth, real interest rates increase steadily and 
real effective exchange rate appreciates and then depreciates4. 
 
It is possible to ask, why although all banks in a country are exposed to the same 
macroeconomic conditions generally not all of them fail? The answer to this 
question is connected with microeconomic causes of banking crisis and therefore 
microeconomic (that mean banking specific) early warning signals can be applied. 
 
The best indicators are those that are closely related to the soundness of the banking 
sector and of individual banks. Most often are used indicators based on items from 
banks´ balance sheets or income statements such as: 
 
• Capital adequacy - the level of bank capitalization and changes in bank 
capitalization. Bank capital acts as a cushion against potential losses, so the 
higher the capital adequacy ratio the lower the risk of banking crisis. The 
requested level of the capital adequacy depends on the riskiness of bank’s assets 
and so reflects the bank’s exposure to the credit risk, market risk and after the 
Basle II also operational risk. Decrease in capital adequacy ratio below the level 
requested by the regulator indicates the increase in solvency risk and potential 
financial distress. 
 
• Asset quality. It includes repayment performance and capacity to pay of 
borrowers, diversification of portfolio by individual borrower, sector and 
country, and currency composition. Asset quality is usually measured by the 
level of nonperforming loans. A large share of nonperforming loans is a result of 
earlier poor loan decisions, poor credit policy, sometimes of deteriorating 
economic conditions and lack of diversification. Classified loans means 
potential losses for banks, banks are obliged to create loan loss provisions and it 
worsens bank profitability and efficiency5. Study of Gonzáles-Hermosillo (1999) 
conclude that problem banks had significantly higher exposures than 
nonproblem banks to sectors that had initially been booming but had gone bust 
shortly before the banking crisis hit. 
 
• Because weak performance can ultimately threaten bank solvency, it is 
important to monitor bank profitability as well. Unfavourable values of ROA 
and ROE ratios, especially values lower than zero, are often related with poor 
asset quality and huge level of nonperforming loans and created loan loss 
provisions. 
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 From the analysis made by the IMF (1998) arises that the real exchange rate appreciation is 
statistically significant 3, 8 and 13 months before the crisis - p. 95. 
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 For analysis of bank efficiency see for example Stavárek, D and Polouček, S (2004), 
‘Efficiency and Profitability in the Banking Sector’. In Polouček, S (ed.) ‘Reforming the 
Financial Sector in Central European Countries’. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 75 - 
135.  
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• Rapid change in the structure of banks´ assets and liabilities. It concerns 
maturity and currency mismatch between assets and liabilities, these mismatches 
creates the interest rate risk and currency risk. The greater the mismatch, the 
higher the risks and the greater the probabilities of future financial difficulties. 
Gonzáles-Hermosillo (1999) found that market risk and liquidity risk were 
generally important in determining bank distress and eventual bank failure. 
 
Also bank-specific variables predicted crisis reasonably well in most cases, 
introducing macroeconomic variables generally improved their predictive power 
because both microeconomic and macroeconomic influences are important in 
determining banking crisis. 
 
The following hypothesis will be tested in the fourth chapter: 
• H1: before the crisis the real GDP growth starts to decline 
• H2: before the crisis the consumption and investments start to decline 
• H3: before the crisis the inflation rate starts to growth 
• H4: before the crisis the exchange rate appreciates and than depreciates 
• H5: before the crisis the credit contraction occurs 
• H6: before the crisis interest rates increase steadily 
• H7: before the crisis the capital adequacy ratio decrease 
• H8: before the crisis the bank profitability decrease 
• H9: before the crisis the level of nonperforming loans increases 
 
Banking crisis in the Czech Republic 
 
The Czech banking sector has experienced two periods of the banking crisis in the 
90´s. The first period was connected with troubles of small and medium sized banks 
– it started in 1993 with forced administration of Kreditní a průmyslová banka Praha 
and continued with troubles of other small banks. The number of small banks 
decreased from 22 in 1993 to only 8 in 2002. 17 banks have lost their licence 
because of their bad financial situation6, the others because of mergers and sales. 
The share of nonperforming loans strongly exceeded both thresholds mentioned in 
the first chapter - see Table 1. Although the segment of small and medium sized 
banks has only 9 % share of the bank sector in 1993 the number of failure banks has 
substantially weakened public confidence in the banking sector.  
                                                           
6 15 banks have problems with bad asset quality, 1 bank with liquidity. 1 bank has lost its 
licence due to frauds.  
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Table 1 - Selected indicators of banking crisis in the Czech Republic 
 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 3Q03 
Total banks 52 55 54 53 50 47 42 40 38 36 35 
   Big7  6 6 5 5 5 5 4 3 3 4 4 
   Small  22 21 18 12 9 3 9 8 8 8 8 
Classified 
loans8 
n.a. 36.5 33.1 29.3 26.9 27.1 32.2 29.8 21.5 16.9 12.3 
Source: Czech National Bank 
 
The second period of the banking crisis concerned troubles of big state owned 
banks. The share of nonperforming loans exceeded 30 % in 1999 (see Table 1) and 
strongly confirms the existence of systemic banking crisis.9 
 
Early warning signals in the Czech Republic 
 
Speaking about macroeconomic early warning signals, these indicators are generally 
watched regularly so all data needed for the analysis are available in official 
statistics of Czech Statistical Office or in International Financial Statistics of 
International Monetary Fund. Table 2 shows the development of real GDP growth, 
level of consumption and investments, inflation measured by consumer price index 
and values of real effective exchange rate. 
 
Table 2 – Development of selected macroeconomic early warning signals10 
Indicator 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 
GDP growth  92.3   94.4   100.0 104.3 103.5 102.4 102.9 106.3 109.7 
Consumptio
n 
509.5 607.0 701.7 818.2 899.9 966.1 1019 1074 1157 
Investments 289.6 339.8 442.5 500.6 514.5 535.5 528.3 561.4 610.9 
CPI 83.3 91.6 100.0 108.8 118.1 130.7 133.5 138.7 145.2 
Exchan. rate 92.1 96.7 100.0 106.6 107.5 116.3 114.7 114.8 121.3 
Source: International Financial Statistics of IMF 
 
According to the hypothesis defined in previous chapter (H1 – H4), before the 
banking crisis hit the position of the economy should be in the status of rapid end of 
a previous boom. However, data in the table about development of consumption and 
investments definitely do not testify hypothesis H2. The GDP growth was slightly 
lower in 1997 and 1998 (H1). 
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 Big banks are banks with total assets higher than 100 billions CZK 
8 Classified loans in percent of total loans 
9 For the analysis of causes of the Czech banking crisis see Vodová (2003) 
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 Real GDP growth, CPI and real effective exchange rate – index numbers (1995 = 100); 
consumption and investments in billions of CZK 
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Table 3 – Credits to private sector 
Credits 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 
Billions CZK 508.7 683.2 1037 1159 1250 1176 1098 1029 916.4 
In % of GDP 39.9 52.4 75.1 80.5 87.5 83.2 77.3 70.2 60.5 
Source: International Financial Statistics of IMF; author’s calculation 
 
Before the crisis banks, after the previous rapid growth there should be the 
contraction of credits to private sectors (H5). Data in Table 3 confirms this 
hypothesis in case of systemic banking crisis (troubles of big banks): within first 
four years the absolute volume of provided loans has expanded more than twice and 
the share of credits on GDP has risen from 39.9 % up to 87.5 % in 199711. After this 
peak has followed the contraction and banks have provided less and less loans. In 
last years, most banks orientate more on investments in securities and less on 
providing credits so the share of credits on GDP has fallen to 60 %.  
 
Looking on development of nominal and real interest rates (see Figure 1), it is 
evident, that at the beginning of analysed period the existence of negative real 
interest rates was one of the factor standing behind bad financial situation of banks. 
Nominal interest rates have raised steadily till 1997 and this evolution confirm the 
hypothesis H6 about the role of interest rates as an early warning signal. 
 
Figure 1 – Nominal and real interest rates12 
 
Source: Czech National Bank and author’s calculation 
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 Such a high amount of loans is the result of the fact that banks played a key role in process 
of transition from central planned to market economy and satisfied enormous demand  for 
credits needed to privatization 
12
 Annual average interest rates from new provided loans; real interest rates are deflated by 
CPI 
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When it comes to bank-specific (microeconomic) indicators, problems with 
available data arise, especially in case of data about currency and maturity 
mismatch. Nevertheless, some other applicable ratios remain. 
 
The capital adequacy ratio has significantly decreased in 1996. This was caused 
partly by the change in methodology of capital adequacy calculation; however the 
greater role in the decline has played the gradually worsening quality of credit 
portfolios. The poor quality of credit portfolio has negatively influenced bank 
profitability: the average Czech bank ended its book with losses in 1997, 1998 and 
1999. The values of the share of nonperforming loans have two peaks: the first one 
in 1994 (and since then this value has not been overcame), the second one in 1999. 
Both years correspond with peaks of banking crisis: in 1994 with troubles of small 
and medium sized banks, in 1999 with problems of big banks – see Table 4. 
 
Table 4 – Development of selected microeconomic early warning signals13 
Indicator 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 
Capital 
adequacy  
n.a. 11.2 12.4 10.3 10.6 12.1 13.2 14.8 15.4 
Return on 
assets 
n.a. 0.48 0.09 0.27 -0.17 -0.36 -0.25 0.68 0.73 
Return on 
equity 
n.a. 14.0 10.9 10.3 -3.5 -8.3 -5.3 13.1 16.6 
Nonperform. 
loans14 
n.a.15 36.5 33.1 29.3 26.9 27.1 32.2 29.8 21.5 
Source: Czech National Bank 
 
Speaking about the banking sector as a whole, the level of nonperforming loans 
seems to be rather good signal of forthcoming financial distress (H9), even in case of 
Czech Republic, where the share of nonperforming loans is strongly affected by the 
consolidation and stabilisation programs which should help banks. Slightly different 
is the situation in case of profitability ratios (H8): although in the period of 1993 – 
1996 many small banks have failure, the banking sector as a whole has remained 
profitable. Surely, this was caused by the fact that the segment of small and medium 
sized banks has represented only 9 % share of the banking sector. The capital 
adequacy ratio in case of Czech Republic seems to be slightly less quality indicator 
(H7): its values are strongly influenced by capital injections to big banks before their 
privatization. 
 
Conclusion 
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 ROA, ROE and capital adequacy in percent; nonperforming loans in percent of total credits 
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 According to the arrangement of Czech National Bank, nonperforming loans concern 
watch, substandard, doubtful and loss loans. The classification is made according to the delay 
in repayment – 30-90 days in case of watch loans, 91-180 in case of substandard loans, 181-
360 days in case of doubtful loans and more than 360 days for loss loans  
15
 The methodology for loan classification was established in 1994  
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The aim of this paper was to characterise the role of early warning signals in 
measuring the vulnerability of countries to systemic banking crisis and to analyse 
how successfully these indicators have been able to predict the banking crisis in case 
of Czech Republic. 
 
Microeconomic early warning signals seemed to be very good in predicting systemic 
banking crisis that means situation in which most of the banking sector is affected 
by financial distress. In case of Czech Republic in the period around 1998 when big 
banks have suffered by financial distress hypothesis 6 – 9 were confirmed. But when 
it comes to the first period of banking crisis (troubles of small banks around 1995) 
the predictive power of these signals was less consistent because the used indicators 
cover banking sector as a whole. Although this situation could not be marked as 
“systematic” it has strongly weaken the public confidence in banking sector and has 
negative influences as well. 
 
Speaking about macroeconomic early warning signals (hypothesis 1 – 5), their 
predictive power was mixed in case of Czech Republic. As a Czech specific, the 
development of consumption and investments (H2) did not testify their predictive 
power, even in the period of banking crisis these two variables were growing. The 
indicator provided loans to private sector (H5) and the development of real GDP 
growth (H1) have given notice on forthcoming systemic banking crisis, not on 
forthcoming troubles of small banks again. 
 
Time series of values of early warning signals are short for the present. Moreover, an 
early warning system contents such variables whose behaviour prior to the episode 
of banking crisis is systematically different from that during normal period but the 
analysed period was the period of economic transformation and it is difficult to say 
which values correspond to “normal period”. 
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Resumé 
 
EARLY WARNING SIGNALS AND ITS ROLE IN PREVENTING BANKING 
CRISES 
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In den letzten Jahrzenten erlebten viele Länder eine Bankkrise, zum Beispiel 
Mexiko (in den Jahren 1994 – 1995), die Länder in Südostasien (1997) und 
transitive Wirtschaften (in den neunziger Jahren des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts). Es 
betrifft auch die Tschechische Republik. 
 
Die Bankkrisen können  durch eine ganze Reihe von Faktoren verursacht werden. 
Systematische Bankkrisen sind mit  relativ hohen fiskalischen und ökonomischen 
Kosten verbunden und ihre Lösung ist überhaupt nicht einfach. Mit der Ausnutzung 
der Signale der rechtzeitigen Warnung ist es aber möglich, die bevorstehende Krise 
voraussagen. Diese Anzeiger bilden also nicht nur den Raum für rechtzeitige und 
angemessene Reaktionen der Wirtschaftspolitik, sondern können auch wie eine 
Prävention der Bankkrisen oder mindestens wie eine Milderung ihrer Folgen wirken. 
 
In dem ersten Teil des Beitrags werden der Begriff Bankkrise und die Anzeiger der 
Bankkrise definiert. Der zweite Teil des Beitrags charakterisiert einzige Signale der 
rechtzeitigen Warnung, und zwar sowohl maroökonomische (die Entwicklung des 
Bruttoinlandsproduktes, des Verbrauchs, der Investitionen, der Inflation usw.), als 
auch ebenfalls mikroökonomische, also spezifische für jede Bank (das Niveau und 
Veränderungen in der Kapitalangemessenheit der Bank, die Entwicklung der 
eingeräumten Kredite, die Entwicklung des Anteils der klasifizierten Kredite, die 
Veränderungen in der Struktur der Fälligkeit der Aktiva und Passiva usw.). Es folgt 
die Charakteristik der Bankkrise in der Tschechischen Republik. Der letzte Teil des 
Beitrags umfasst die Entwicklug der Werte der Signale der rechtzeitigen Warnung in 
der Tschechischen Republik im Zeitraum vor dem Ausbruch der Bankkrise und es 
10 
wird analysiert, ob es möglich war, aufgrund der Signale die  bevorstehende Krise 
voraussagen. 
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